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Jacques of All Trades: Derrida, Lacan,
and the Commercial Lawyer
Sidney W. DeLong
While postmodern legal scholarship has had only modest impact on legal
practice, it has left a trail of anguish in the legal academy. I refer particularly to
the unhealthy envy it has produced in those who teach more prosaic subjects,
such as commercial law. "Gosh," they are often heard to say, as they blow the
suds off their beer, "I sure wish I could deploy some of those fancy literary
devices such as semiotics, hermeneutics, and speech act theory." Or, "Gee, I
just knowYale would publish my Practitioner's Guide to ThePackers and Stockyards
Act if only I could work in a reference to deconstruction."
Until now, their curiosity about continental philosophy has been squelched
by those members of the academy who got there first. Consider Pierre Schlag's
stinging observation that to ask "What is deconstruction?" is to reveal that one
does not understand deconstruction.1 Confused, yet silenced, by such rebuffs,
most commercial law teachers have withdrawn in shame to their blue-collar
demimonde.
Does it have to be this way? Can there be hope for people who think a
"dangerous supplement"2 is an outdated pocket part? Who when they hear the
word norm think first of the fat guy on Cheers?3 Who think a "foundationalist" is
someone like Henry Ford. Well, the answer is no, there can't be really. They
SidneyW. DeLong is Associate Professor at Seattle University School of Law. The author assumes
no responsibility for the accuracy of anything expressed herein.
1. "Le Hors De Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction,
11 Cardozo L Rev. 1631, 1631-33 (1990). Schlag argues that the "What is. . ." form of this
question already presumes a sort of answer (a presence) that it is the aim of deconstruction to
contest. I would suggest that novices who want to avoid this embarrassing pitfall should
instead ask meta-questions such as "What sort of question should I ask to learn something
about deconstruction?" or "If I were to ask you the correct question about deconstruction,
what answer would you give?"
2. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 141 (Baltimore, 1976)
(an exterior addition that calls into question the sufficiency of presence).
3. Instead of an unsupportable value judgment. E.g., Symposium, The Critique of Normativity,
139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801 (1991).
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are too far behind and this stuff is way too hard to understand.4 But that is no
reason for them not to enjoy their own version of continental philosophy,
especially now that it has become safely passe. I myself have enjoyed remark-
able success in adapting deconstructionist and post-Freudian theory to com-
mercial law and am willing to share my secrets with any aspiring commercial
law scholar eager to make the leap.
The key to the successful integration of postmodern thought into your own
scholarship is stunningly simple: all you have to do is not care whether you
really get it right. Wannabe postmoderns don't realize that misunderstanding
and misusing postmodern scholarship is a very low-risk proposition. Before
you came to grief, you would have to be unlucky enough for one of the dozen
or so people in the world who really do understand postmodern scholarship
to (1) actually read your article in The Business Lawyer, (2) realize that you had
said something ciearly inaccurate instead of obscurely inspired, (3) be confi-
dent enough to take you on, (4) care enough about your article or your error
to spear you in print, and (5) do you more harm than good in publicizing what
you wrote. The odds of all these things occurring is about equal to that of all
the planets coming into perfect alignment.'
Once freed from this outdated anxiety, you too will soon be turning out
articles like "The Social Construction of Cowness in the Packers and Stock-
yards Act," or "Silencing the Lambs: Narratives of Loss and Evisceration in the
Packers and Stockyards Act," or "Cattle Prods and Cutting Pens: A General
Solution to Indeterminacy in the Packers and Stockyards Act." Anyway, to help
get you started, I've illustrated a couple of basic ideas by using the UCC.
Diff6rance in Article 2
The first lesson concerns the idea of diffejrance.Jacques Derrida created this
clever French pun on two words meaning "difference" and "deferral." To
4. I could illustrate this statement with thousands of examples, but I will confine myself to one,
a single paragraph from Julia Kristeva:
Of course, no political discourse can pass into nonmeaning. Its goal, Marx
stated explicitly, is to reach the goal of interpretation: interpreting the world
in order to transform it according to our needs and desires. Now, from the
position of the post-Freudian, post-phenomenological analyst-a position
which is really an untenable locus of rationality, a close proximity of meaning
and nonmeaning-it is clear that there is no World (or that the World is not
all there is) and that to transform it is only one of the circles of the
interpretation-be it Marxist-which refuses to perceive that itwinds around
a void.
Psychoanalysis and the Polis, in The Politics of Interpretation, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell, trans.
Margaret Waller, 83, 93 (Chicago, 1983).
Now here in this footnote, where I hope nobody can see, I make my confession: even after
someone took the trouble to translate this paragraph from French into English, even though
I know the meanings of all the words used, even though I can identify the subjects and verbs
of all the sentences, I haven't the faintest idea of what she means. Not even a little bit. Not a
single thought. None. Zip. Nihil. There. I feel better.
5. If, despite these odds, the unthinkable actually happens, do not panic and do not under any
circumstances confess your error. "Error" is an archaic, foundationalist notion insofar as it
implies the possibility of truth. Instead, either (1) claim that you were engaged in a "creative
misreading" (Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction 175-79 (Ithaca, 1982)); or (2) chide your
antagonist for failing to detect your postmodemist irony.
6. You have to practice until you can say this word with a French accent.
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understand how really funny it is, you have to know something about semiotics,
which is the science of signs and language. Semiotic theory holds that sign
systems create meaning not by the inherent properties of the signs themselves
but by the differences among the signs that make them up.7 Phonetically, cat is
recognized only insofar as it is different from bat, mat, dog, etc. Likewise with
the signifieds, the concepts for which signs stand. Up is known by its difference
from down; good by its difference from evil; red by its difference from blue
and green.
Systems of difference often treat opposing terms asymmetrically, so that
one term, e.g., good, is "privileged" over its opposing element, bad. It is a
characteristic of any system of difference that the effective privileging of one
term is dependent upon the maintenance of the excluded term over against
which the privileged term has meaning. Up may be good, but there can be no
up without down. The subordinate term is merely deferred, not annihilated.
Moreover, and this is a deconstructionist practical joke, the privileged/subor-
dinate relation between any set of opposing terms is inherently unstable and
subject to reversal. For example, as he becomes more and more evil, Satan
begins to steal the show in Paradise Lost. Deconstruction is the banana peel on
the sidewalk of Language.
Now for your first lesson. As you know, all sales of goods by merchants who
sell such goods are subject to the implied warranty of merchantability unless
thatwarranty is effectively disclaimed! Were I to ask a commercial lawyerwhat
was necessary to disclaim such a warranty, she would probably say that the
UCC requires that any written disclaimer mention "merchantability" and be
"conspicuous."9 Such naivet6 discloses an insensitivity to differance. I would
inform her that she has it exactly backwards: the UCC requires that any
effective disclaimer contain nonconspicuous language that does not mention
merchantability.
If pressed for an explanation, I would smile condescendingly, stub out my
Galloise in her Danish, and proceed: The term conspicuous is defined in
section 1-201 (10):
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A
printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is
conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger
or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is
"conspicuous." Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for
decision by the court.
Here we find a perfect illustration of a self-deconstructing text, complete
with dangerous supplement. Notice first how this definition seeks to create
7. Frederick de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, eds. Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye,
trans. Wade Baskins (NewYork, 1959).
8. U.C.C. § 2-314.
9. "Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or
any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous .... " U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
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dfforance by privileging capitals at the expense of lower-case letters and larger
letters at the expense of smaller. Capitals'0 are claimed to be conspicuous in
themselves, without apparent regard to the need for the subordinated lower-
case letters to make them so. The text strives to make this point self-evident by
its embedded example. Yet, in illustrating itself, the text undoes itself. We can
easily reveal the instability of this hierarchy by inverting it:
"CONSPICUOUS": A TERM OR CLAUSE IS CONSPICUOUS WHEN IT
IS SO WRITTEN THAT A REASONABLE PERSON AGAINST WHOM IT
IS TO OPERATE OUGHT TO HAVE NOTICED IT. A PRINTED HEADING
IN CAPITALS (AS: non-negotiable bill of lading) IS CONSPICUOUS.
LANGUAGE IN THE BODY OF A FORM IS "CONSPICUOUS" IF IT IS IN
LARGER OR OTHER CONTRASTING TYPE OR COLOR. BUT IN A
TELEGRAM ANY STATED TERM IS "CONSPICUOUS." WHETHER A
TERM OR CLAUSE IS "CONSPICUOUS" OR NOT IS FOR DECISION BY
THE COURT.
Now which of thesewords is conspicuous? The text of the statute tells us that
it is all of the paragraph except for the surviving lower-case letters. But surely
the lower-case letters, in violation of the law, have themselves become con-
spicuous. Whatever the text seeks to make "conspicuous" depends on the rest
of the text for its character.
To complete the undoing of itself, the text refers to the telegram rule. This
exception is a classic form of dangerous supplement. While the main body of
the statute struggles to maintain the natural distinction between the conspicu-
ous and the inconspicuous, the telegram rule tacitly admits that all the
language in any document could simply be declared to be conspicuous. This
admission renders the rest of the statute pointless.
It is now child's play to resolve the matter at hand. Because conspicuous-
ness is defined in terms of contrast, it is impossible for any contract to contain
a conspicuous term dealing with merchantability unless it contains [perhaps a
majority of] nonconspicuous terms dealing with other matters. It follows that
the essential elements of a valid disclaimer of a warranty of merchantability
are nonconspicuous terms that do not pertain to the warranty of merchant-
ability. Q.E.D., n'est-cepas?
Psychoanalytic Reinscription in Article 9
Literary criticism and theory furnish most of the intellectual source mate-
rial for postmodern legal research. We all know what literature is obsessed
with: sex and death. So post-Freudians like Jacques Lacan should figure
heavily in your work. The element of the subconscious in writing has led
deconstructive literary critics to observe that the contradictions of values
described in texts are reinscribed in the very language used to describe them.
Form tends to emulate substance through mechanisms of the unconscious.
Blending this observation with psychoanalytic insights, one builds a powerful
tool for a critical analysis of UCC rhetoric.
10. The reference to "capital" as the dominant element in this hierarchy of commercial value is
not fortuitous, as will be seen in the second part of this essay.
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At the most obvious level, itis no secret that the text of the UCC is saturated
with sexual allusion." Constant exposure to this prose is an occupational
hazard: like overheated medieval monks reading the Song of Solomon, dedi-
cated commercial law professors must have frequent recourse to cold showers
and mortification of the flesh. As I am sure must be standard practice in most
law schools, the ceiling in our commercial law classroom is equipped with one
of those grocery-store vegetable spritzers to keep the students' libidinal tem-
perature at manageable levels.
It is less commonly realized among commercial law scholars, however, that
the code is also a structural figure of gender differentiation. You no doubt
have guessed that I refer chiefly to the juxtaposition of sections 9-314 and
9-315.
The notorious section 9-314 on "accessions" is too painful to describe fully
here. 12 I can bring myself to say only that it concerns collateral that becomes
"affixed" to other collateral in the creation of a "whole" but which neverthe-
less remains vulnerable to being later "removed" by the secured party if the
debtor defaults. The code permits removal even though "physical injury" to
the whole is "caused by the absence of the goods removed."
Do I have to draw you a picture? Can this section be more explicitly male in
its images of rationality, separateness, and castration. Who is this "secured
party" that can remove the recently attached part from the newly formed
whole? Who else indeed but the father in an Oedipal preemptive strike against
the infant son, using the pretext of some default?1
And who can defend the son from this onslaught? The drafters have made
section 9-314 subject only to section 9-315, which ostensibly deals with com-
mingling.14 Section 9-315 provides in part:
11. Two of the most notorious are the suggestive reference to "back-to-back practice" in U.C.C. §
5-116 cmt. 3 and the notion that "[i]nventory of a person is not to be classified as his
equipment." U.C.G. § 9-109(4). And exactly what happens at the "midnight deadline"?
12. (1) A security interest in goods which attaches before they are installed in
or affixed to other goods takes priority as to the goods installed or affixed
(called in this section "accessions") over the daims of all persons to the whole
except as stated in subsection (3) and subject to Section 9-315(1).
(4) When under subsections (1) or (2) and (3) a secured party has an
interest in accessions which has priority over the claims of all persons who
have interests in the whole, he may on default subject to the provisions of Part
5 remove his collateral from the whole but he must reimburse any
encumbrancer or owner of the whole who is not the debtor and who has not,
otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury but not for any
diminution in value of the whole caused by the absence of the goods removed
or by any necessity for replacing them.
13. My interpretation of this passage was confirmed when I observed male law students shifting
nervously in their seats when called upon to explain it.
14. The commingling problem arises when two secured parties have security interests in the
components or raw materials that a debtor uses to manufacture a product for sale. For
example, a paint merchant and a canvas merchant who each sell to an artist on credit may
hold security interests in their products to secure repayment. If the artist paints a picture
using the paint and canvas, then what interests does each creditor have in the painting?
Journal of Legal Education
(1) If a security interest in goods was perfected and subsequently the goods
or a part thereof have become part of a product or mass, the security interest
continues in the product or mass if
(a) the goods are so manufactured, processed, assembled or
commingled that their identity is lost in the product or mass ....
The conventional reading of this text is as historical allegory, a standard
trope of the Fall that begins with Edenic "good," "security," and "perfection,"
then descends to modernist alienation and loss of identity, before culminating
in a postindustrial, Maoist reference to production and the masses. I would
guess it is taught that way in 95 percent of American law schools.
But I wish to surface the Freudian aspects of this text, which, as we have
seen, represents the infant son's only hope of salvation. In this regard, com-
ment 3 to section 9-315 contains a very revealing image: "This section applies
not only to cases where flour, sugar and eggs are commingled into cake mix or
cake, but also to cases where components are assembled into a machine."
To the astute reader, the real operation of section 9-315 takes place in the
figurative language of the comment, not in the statutory text. The drafters
subconsciously reinscribed the oppositions of the statutory text in the imagis-
tic rhetoric of the comment, whichjuxtaposes the image of a cake against the
image of a machine. Our strong construction of gendered roles in the home
and at work will assign obvious meaning to these images. The cake is organic,
a machine mechanical. The cake is domestic, the machine commercial. Most
important, the cake is feminine, the machine masculine. The ingredients of
cake are associated with female (re)production (viz., the eggs) while the
machine suggests the male genitalia, whose presence is dramatically empha-
sized by the very absence of any textual reference to them. The juxtaposition
of these examples reinscribes at a meta-level the combination of elements
operating within each one and between the statutory sections themselves.
The competing secured parties are thus revealed to be the primal parents,
the paradigmatically "secure" parties. The creative act of commingling can
only be the mixing of egg and sperm in the creation of the child, in which the
identity of each is lost in the whole. The competing claims of the secured
parties to the "whole" thus become the competing claims of the parents to the
child, claims that would tear the child asunder. But in contrast to section 9-
314's barbaric de(con)struction of the child, section 9-315 benignly insists
that he be instead sold and the proceeds divided. Even as it offers this
maternal rescue from the father's threat, however, section 9-315 expresses the
anxiety that a child feels at his lack of individual identity and at his status as
vehicle for the submerged identities of its parents.
Thus, the code reinscribes the antagonistic interdependence of being and
nothingness. The male-oriented section 9-314 marks the anxiety of being: the
return to disintegration. The female-oriented section 9-315 marks the anxiety
of nonbeing: the loss of identity (as negation, as pour soi) in an enfolding,
oceanic, maternal plenitude from which one can never emerge. These twin
threats ironically but necessarily emanate from the parents, the source of all
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existence. I have found that this unexpected textual encounter with the
human condition never fails to leave my students dispirited and glum. 5
There's really very little else I can tell you. All you have to do is glance
through a few postmodern essays for footnote fodder,16 work on your verbs
(use words like deploy, inscribe, efface, constitute), write "always, already" 7 a lot,
and you're on your way. Life will never be the same.
15. That at least is my explanation for my student evaluation reports.
16. I will soon be offering for sale a set of boilerplate footnotes citing works by the usual
postmodernists in the original languages. Each will come with a full warranty of accuracy, so
that if they are inserted verbatim, the editors ofyotir favorite commercial lawjournal will not
have to citecheck them.
17. Or is it "already, always"? I always forget.

